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This paper examines the long-run and short-run determinants of unleaded petrol price in Australia’s 
capital cities using monthly data to find out whether prices respond asymmetrically to external 
shocks. In the long-run petrol prices are mainly determined by Tapis crude oil and Singapore petrol 
prices. There is some evidence of asymmetric price adjustments in the short-run since petrol price 
increases have been mostly passed on to the consumer faster than price decreases in four capital 
cities. One can thus argue that there are a significant degree of market inefficiency and/or collusion, 
requiring a closer government price monitoring and scrutiny.  
 
I  Introduction 
For many Australians petrol expenses constitute a substantial part of their fortnightly income 
and petrol price rises have a direct, and appreciable effect on their standard of living (Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission Inquiry, ACCC, 2007). Valadkhani and Mitchell (2002) 
have examined the expected impact of petrol price rises on inflation. Although they found that the 
Australian economy is less vulnerable to oil price rises now than it was in the 1970s, the 
distributional impacts of price rises are more pronounced on poor families. They estimate that, if 
petrol prices are doubled, ceteris paribus, the rate of inflation accelerates by an additional 2 per cent 
on the top of what otherwise would have prevailed in the economy. Their results clearly indicate 
that the transport and agricultural sectors would mostly bear the cost of this price rise and the price 
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rises are regressive in their impact (Valadkhani and Mitchell, 2002). Therefore, it can be argued that 
petrol prices can significantly contribute to the rising rates of inflation in Australia. 
Concern about Australia’s petrol prices has been the subject of several inquiries (e.g Industry 
Commission Inquiry, IC, 1994; ACCC, 1996, 2007; Queensland Parliament, 2006). Each of these 
inquiries, which are mostly based on survey data and descriptive price comparisons, has identified 
some of the economic factors contributing to petrol price rises. Walker et al. (1997) have reviewed 
two of these early inquiries (IC, 1994 and ACCC, 1996) and conclude that higher petrol prices and 
large retail price differences between the country and metropolitan areas are attributable to the lack 
of competition among petrol importers and the limited market power of independent discount 
retailers. In the wholesale market, the ACCC (2007) has recently also discovered that movements in 
domestic regular unleaded petrol prices are not commensurate with changes in the international 
benchmark for unleaded petrol used by Australian refiners. 
According to FuelWatch (2009), Tapis crude oil prices (not West Texas Intermediate, which is 
the US market benchmark) and the Singapore price of Mogas 95 petrol are the major supply-side 
determinants of Australia’s petrol prices.1 The terminal gate prices usually make up around 95 per 
cent of pump prices. The wholesale price is typically based on a rolling average of: the spot price 
for the Singapore Mogas 95 unleaded petrol, the allocated shipping cost from Singapore to 
Australia, insurance, wharfage cost, and conversion from US dollars to Australian dollars. The 
Singapore price of petrol plus shipping costs and Australian taxes constitute 95 per cent of the 
wholesale price of petrol (FuelWatch, 2009). The major objectives of this paper are to answer (test) 
the following questions (hypotheses) for each of seven capital cities, upon which disaggregated 
monthly price data are readily available: First, do unleaded retail petrol prices respond 
asymmetrically to external shocks such as changes in crude oil prices or international petrol prices? 
If crude oil prices and/or the Singapore benchmark petrol prices increase, will the Bacon’s (1991) 
                                                     
1
 Mogas 95 unleaded petrol is considered to be the closest substitute for Australian regular unleaded petrol. 
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“rockets-and-feathers hypothesis” be applicable in the context of Australia? That is to say, will 
petrol prices “shoot up like rockets” in response to say positive oil price shocks and “float down 
like feathers” in response to price falls? In other words, will petrol prices respond quickly following 
a rise in the price of crude oil, but fall much slower to crude-oil price decreases?  Second, when 
crude oil prices and/or the Singapore benchmark petrol price increase (due to external shocks), on 
average, how much does the retail price of petrol rise in various capital cities?  
This paper provides an analytical framework for making more informed and objective 
assessments of the sources of Australia’s unleaded petrol price fluctuations, resulting in greater 
efficiency and transparency of retail petrol market. Using an entirely different approach, this study 
systematically examines the magnitude and dynamics of petrol price responses to global 
macroeconomic influences. Although previous studies and surveys (undertaken or commissioned 
mainly by the ACCC) have already covered this topic, they do not provide answers to all of the 
questions indicated above. Enough disaggregated time series data are now available to enable a 
meaningful econometric analysis of this issue. This study will be the first independent (non-
government) academic study which will systematically examine the asymmetric effects of changes 
in (a) Tapis crude oil prices; and (b) the Singapore benchmark price. It identifies the major sources 
of asymmetric fluctuations in unleaded petrol prices by using threshold and asymmetric error-
correction models. The proposed models in this study have been adopted in similar contexts in the 
literature (see for example Borenstein et al., 1997; Bachmeier and Griffin, 2003; Radchenko, 2005; 
Chen et al. 2005; and Al-Gudhea at al., 2007) and provide useful policy-relevant frameworks that 
can be used to forecast petrol prices across various parts of Australia and to evaluate the potential 
outcomes of policies and external events on those prices. 
To date, there is no publicised Australian study that includes all major petrol price 
determinants in one single dynamic model and investigates the significance of each variable in 
explaining asymmetry in the retail distribution process. For example, Reilly and Witt (1998) 
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included both the price of crude oil and the exchange rate in the UK to test the competing 
explanations for the asymmetric response. In addition, according to the recent inquiry of the ACCC 
(2007), average Australian retail petrol prices broadly follow the movements in the Singapore 
benchmark price. Al-Gudhea at al. (2007) argues that the crude oil price is a principal determinant 
of changes in petrol prices but there are several other major determinants such as the exchange rate 
and the Singapore benchmark price if a significant portion of petrol is to be imported. Previous 
studies have not included all of these factors together. The omission of such factors constitutes 
omitted variable bias and invalidates their policy conclusions.  
Therefore, in order to avoid mis-specified models, it is of paramount importance to include all 
major determinants of petrol prices in a model. This relatively important issue seems to have been 
neglected in previous econometric analysis of the Australian petrol market. This paper examines the 
issue of petrol price asymmetries in regard to not only the crude price but also in relation to the 
Singapore petrol prices where all variables are expressed in Australian currency.  
Empirical findings on price asymmetry for North American markets have been mixed and 
ambiguous. For example, Chen et al. (2005) use switching thresholds in a cointegration model of 
price adjustment and find evidence of asymmetry not only in short- and long-run adjustment but 
also across the spot and future markets. Karrenbrock (1991), Borenstein et al. (1997), Balke et al., 
(1998) and Galeotti et al. (2003) have examined the same issue and concluded that not only petrol 
price increases are passed on to the consumer faster than price decreases but also petrol prices 
respond asymmetrically to changes in oil prices. But on the other hand, several other studies (e.g. 
Godby et al., 2000; Bachmeier and Griffin, 2003) are quite skeptical of this view, arguing for no 
evidence of asymmetry between petrol prices and crude oil prices. As stated above, little substantive 
empirical work has been conducted regarding the dynamic effects of a change in crude oil prices on 
Australia’ retail petrol prices. This project for the first time will adopt the threshold and asymmetric 
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error-correction models to resolve the ongoing controversy over whether retail unleaded prices rise 
more readily than they fall due to external shocks in the petroleum or foreign exchange markets.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section II discusses briefly the theoretical 
framework of the threshold cointegration analysis employed in the paper. Section III presents the 
sources and summary statistics of the data employed as well as the unit root test results. Section IV 
presents the empirical econometric results. Finally the last section offers some concluding 
comments. 
II Theoretical Framework 
Unlike other goods like milk or bread, the price of petrol changes at very high frequency. 
They may also charge higher prices on some days of the week to offset the losses associated with 
deeply discounted days. In some locations prices follow a weekly cycle, whereby petrol is generally 
cheapest on Tuesdays (for example) and more expensive during weekends and at the start of public 
holidays.2 While the price for crude oil falls, service stations may continue advertising high prices 
for a few days or weeks. The estimated gross retail margins (proxied say by the difference between 
the estimated retail prices and the Singapore petrol prices) are expected to be higher in the regional 
areas due to the fact that competition is less intense than in the city. How can we incorporate these 
stylised facts in our model? In order to exclude unnecessary noise associated with the day-of-the 
week effect and focus on major sources of petrol price rises, monthly data are used in this paper. 
The data include Tapis crude oil prices, Singapore petrol price and retail average petrol prices for 
seven capital cities (Adelaide, Brisbane, Darwin, Hobart, Pert, Melbourne and Sydney). The 
monthly data span from May 1998 to January 2009 totalling 129 observations. The long-run 
relationship between the retail petrol price (P) and its three major determinants has been specified 
in equation (1): 
                                                     
2
 These weekly price cycles may be associated with supply management, with deep discounting arising, for example, 
immediately prior to the next delivery of fuel to the retailer, by the wholesaler. 
 - 6 - 
0 1 2 3jt t t t jtp o s Tα α α α ε= + + + +                 (1) 
where:  
Pjt= Unleaded petrol price per litre in A$ (where j denotes one of the seven capital cities in Australia 
(j=1,2,…,7) and pjt=Ln(Pjt), 
Et=the exchange rate ($US per each $A), 
OILt=Tapis crude oil prices per barrel in $US and ot=Ln(OILt/Et) denotes Tapis crude oil prices per 
barrel in $A, 
SINt= Singapore (Mogas 95) petrol prices (FOB and in US cents per gallon) and st=Ln(SINt/Et) is 
Singapore petrol prices in Australian cents per gallon,  
Tt is a time trend variable, where 1998M5=1 and 2009M01=129, and 
 Ln=natural logarithm, and the estimated sα are the long-run coefficients, which are expected to be 
all positive. 
Let us now assume that all of the variables appearing on both sides of equation (1) are I(1). 
According to Engle and Granger  (1987), the stationary residuals resulting from equation (1) could 
then form an error correction (EC) mechanism representing the short-run deviation from the long 
run equilibrium (if any). That is: 
 
1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 3 1
Long-run pathDeviation from Actual value
the long-run path
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )jt jt jt t t tEC p o s Tε α α α α− − − − − −= = − + + +

               (2) 
Standard cointegration tests implicitly assume a symmetric adjustment process but if petrol 
price adjustments are asymmetric or if prices are sticky in the downward direction, these tests can 
be mis-specified. In other words, the Engle-Granger type tests with a linear adjustment procedure 
will be inappropriate when the dynamic adjustment of prices in fact could follow a non-linear 
behaviour. If the Johansen Cointegration test indicates that there is only one cointegrating vector, 
then the underlying adjustment dynamics of petrol prices in response to changes in exogenous 
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variables can be captured by using the following threshold error-correction model (Enders and 
Granger, 1998; Enders and Siklos, 2001): 
1 0 0
11
1 1 0
1
          (1 )
k k k
jt i jt i i t i i t i i t i i t i
i i i
t j jt t j jt i it j it
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∑
           (3) 
where:  
}{ ,0  if 0 and 0 if 0jt jt jt t jt jt jto max o o o o o o+ + + +∆ = ∆ ⇒ ∆ = ∆ ∆ ≥ ∆ = ∆ < ,
}{ ,0  if 0 and 0 if 0jt jt jt jt jt jt jto min o o o o o o− − − −∆ = ∆ ⇒ ∆ = ∆ ∆ < ∆ = ∆ ≥ ,  
The variables ts
+∆ and ts
−∆  are defined exactly in the same way as jto
+∆ and jto
−∆ . Depending on 
whether the changes in explanatory variables are positive or negative (the threshold being zero), 
,iγ + ,iγ − iη + and iη − are the estimated short-run coefficients. However, it is not necessary to assume 
that the threshold value ( )τ  is always equal to zero for the θ  feedback coefficient. In equation (4) It 
is the Heaviside indicator and τ or the optimum value of threshold are determined endogenously 
such that: 
jt-1
jt-1
ˆ1 if 
 
ˆ0 if t
I
ε τ
ε τ
<
=  ≥
                         (4) 
Therefore, jθ − and jθ + are the different speeds of adjustment on the basis of the deviations 
from long-run. It should be noted that when the null of j jθ θ− += cannot be rejected, price adjustments 
are no longer asymmetric and this can be done by conducting a standard F-test. Given that the value 
of the threshold is unknown, its value ( )τ should be empirically determined. A consistent value of 
the threshold can be found by undertaking a grid search by first sorting the jtεˆ sequence in an 
ascending order as proposed by Enders and Siklos (2001). To have enough observations in each 
regime, I will look at each jtεˆ  within the middle 70% of the observations (excluding the first and 
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last 15 per cent of the total number of observations) and whatever value of the threshold which 
yields the lowest residual sum of squares will be considered as a consistent estimate of the 
threshold. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The asymmetric price adjustment process can be better understood by using a graph. In 
Figure 1 if actual prices in the short-run (the dotted line) are below the long-run path (the solid line) 
say at a point between (a) and (b), retail distributors are more likely to increase their price 
immediately to the equilibrium level. Thus, a higher relative speed of adjustment (or the feedback 
coefficient) is expected. On the other hand, if the short-run price is above the long-run path, retail 
suppliers are more likely to keep their price at that level as long as possible or reduce their price to 
the equilibrium very sluggishly. Therefore, the asymmetric short-run price adjustments do exist if 
j jθ θ+ −> . Graphically this means that in Figure 1 the speed at which the short-run price converges 
to the long-run path would be greater between points (a) and (b) compared to the one located 
between (b) to (c). There are also 11 dummy variables, itDUM , in equation (3) capturing the month 
of the year effect.  
As stated earlier, the optimum threshold values are not necessarily equal to zero 
when: 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 3 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 0jt jt jt t t tEC p o s Tε α α α α− − − − − −= ⇒ − + + + =  
 Therefore, on average the optimal threshold value ( )τ could then be located: (1) at the intersection 
points (a) or (b) or (c), where 0τ = ; or (2) at a point between (a) and (b) such as (a’), where 0τ < ; or 
(3) at a point between (b) and (c) such as (b’), where 0τ > . Equation (3) can be interpreted as a two-
regime vector error-correction model with a single cointegrating vector and an endogenously-
determined threshold effect in the error-correction term. This equation allows for an asymmetric 
adjustment response working not only through the deviation from the long-run path (Hansen and 
Seo, 2002) but also through positive and negative short-run dynamic effects of the two exogenous 
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variables in the model (i.e. ,iγ + ,iγ − iη + and iη − ). Granger and Lee (1989), Borenstein et al. (1997), 
Bachmeier and Griffin (2003), and Radchenko (2005) suggest this flexible framework to capture 
any asymmetric effects by alternating regimes as periods of either rising or falling prices associated 
with each of these possible sources. This short-run dynamic model allows for all potential 
asymmetric responses of pjt to be separately captured by short-run changes in ot and st as well as the 
deviation from the long-run path as proxied by ECjt-1. 
It is not counterintuitive to assume that the two explanatory variables to be at least weakly 
exogenous as their values are highly likely to be determined outside of the vector error correction 
system: crude oil and the Singapore petrol prices in global petroleum markets and the exchange rate 
(appearing in the denominator converting $US to Australian currency) in Forex markets around the 
globe. Thus, while upstream price shocks will affect petrol prices contemporaneously, petrol price 
shocks may impact on upstream prices after some lags. Our results (not reported in this paper) 
indicate no simultaneity problem. Using equation (3) and a Wald test, one can then test whether or 
not the relationship between the price of petrol and each of its determinants is asymmetric. Based 
on the test results, the short run asymmetric petrol price responses can be tested as follows: 
• Changes in crude oil prices can exert asymmetry effects on petrol prices if 10 :   i iH iγ γ+ −= ∀  
is rejected. 
• Changes in the Singapore petrol prices will impact asymmetrically on petrol prices if 
2
0 :   i iH iη η+ −= ∀  is rejected. 
• The deviation from the long-run path or EC will have an asymmetric effect on petrol prices 
if 30 :H θ θ+ −= is rejected.  
Equation (3) will be estimated for all possible combinations of the values of the lags (ranging 
between 0-5). The threshold parameter for EC appearing on the right hand side of equation (3) will 
be determined endogenously using a standard grid search. In the grid search for the best threshold 
value, the minimum value of grid will be incremented by 0.0001 sequentially till the maximum 
value is reached.  To have enough observations in each regime, ECjt are first sorted in ascending 
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order, and based on the middle 70 per cent of the observations, the minimum and maximum gird 
search values are determined. Ceteris paribus, any value of the threshold which yields the lowest 
residual sum of squares in equation (3) will be considered as a consistent estimate of the threshold. 
The optimum lag length (k) is chosen on the basis of the AIC. The general-to-specific methodology 
is used to omit insignificant variables in equation (3) on the basis of a battery of maximum 
likelihood tests as well as the AIC. In this method, joint zero restrictions are imposed on current and 
lagged explanatory variables in the unrestricted (general) model to obtain the most parsimonious 
and robust equation in the estimation process. 
III The Data 
Before estimating equations (1) and (3) and report our empirical results, it is important to look 
at the sources and definitions of the data employed in Table 1. The monthly data cover the period 
May 1998 to January 2009 for all variables indicated in equation (1) including the price of unleaded 
petrol for seven capital cities: Adelaide, Brisbane, Darwin, Hobart, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. 
All the figures in this paper are in Australian dollar unless otherwise is stated. Over this period, 
Brisbane (92.8 cents) and Darwin (109.2 cents) witnessed the lowest and the highest average 
unleaded petrol prices, respectively. Monthly minimum price of petrol varied from 63.3 cents in 
Adelaide to a maximum of 173.4 cents in Darwin. Based on the coefficient of variation (CV), 
Brisbane and Darwin had the most and the least volatile petrol prices across Australia. Average 
monthly price of Tapis crude oil ($63.4 per  barrel) over the same period was the most volatile 
series with the highest coefficient of variation  (47.4 per cent). The price of Singapore unleaded 
petrol was the second most volatile series with the CV of 42.6 per cent, fluctuating from 13.8 to 
91.8 cents per litre. The reported skewness, Kurtosis and Jarque-Bera statistics in Table 1 indicate 
that none of the variables are normally distributed.  The results of the ADF test are also presented in 
Table 1, indicating that all of the variables appearing in equation (1) are I(1). 
[Table 1 and Figure 2 about here] 
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 The plots of the price data have been presented in Figure 2. As can be seen, petrol prices in all 
seven capital cities of Australia very closely follow the national average price series. While due to   
state government subsidy in Queensland (i.e. 8.5 cents per litre), petrol prices in Brisbane appear to 
be slightly below the corresponding national average price throughout the period, the opposite is the 
case for Darwin and Hobart. The overall average price of petrol also closely tracks the movements 
of both Tapis crude oil price and the Singapore petrol price. Therefore, one would expect that there 
would be a significant long-run relationship as formulated in equation 1 for each of the seven 
capital cities. Table 2 presents the results of the Johansen (1995) cointegration Trace test as stated 
in equation (1). Consistent with the results of the Engle-Granger test and a visual inspection of the 
data in Figure 2, these results also clearly indicate that there is one statistically significant 
cointegrating vector within each capital cities at the 0.05 level. Both the final prediction error and 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) have consistently point to an optimal lag length of 3 for all 
cities except in the case of Hobart that this lag is found to be two based on the same two criteria.  
[Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
 
 
IV  Empirical Results 
Table 3 present an OLS estimation of equation (1) for each of the seven capital cities over 
the period May 1998-January 2009. Based on the last two columns of this table, the resulting 
residuals from the estimated long-run equations are all I(0) at 1 per cent level of significance, 
supporting the notion of cointegration according to the Engle Granger (1987) two step procedure. 
The adjusted R2 are all very high ranging from a minimum of 0.959 for Darwin to 0.981 for 
Adelaide. The estimated cointegrating vectors, capturing the long-run effects of the price of Tapis 
crude oil (ot) and the Singapore price of unleaded petrol (st) on Australia’s petrol prices, are all 
statistically significant at 1 per cent or better with the expected positive signs. The long-run 
elasticity of petrol price with respect to ot across all seven capital cities vary from a minimum of 
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0.065 in Perth to an unusually high value of 0.146 in Darwin. It should be noted that this elasticity 
is roughly around 0.07-0.08 mark for all other six capital cities.  
The same thing can be said in relation to the long-run elasticity of petrol price with respect 
to st. With the exception of Darwin, the Singapore petrol price elasticity can narrowly vary from a 
minimum of 0.261 (Hobart) to a maximum of a 0.326 (Brisbane). In the case of Sydney, for 
instance 10 per cent rise in ot and st will result in 0.87 and 2.89 per cent increase in the price of 
petrol in the long-run. The time trend variable (Tt) is also highly significant and exerts a positive 
impact on each dependent variable. Based on these results, one can conclude that as expected both 
Tapis crude oil and the Singapore unleaded petrol price are the two major long-run determinants of 
Australian petrol price with the latter exerting a higher impact in terms of the magnitude of its 
estimated long-run elasticities.         
Starting with a maximum lag of five (k=5) in equation (3), the general-to-specific 
methodology is used to omit the insignificant variables in this equation on the basis of a battery of 
maximum likelihood tests and the AIC as a model selection criterion. Using I(0) variables in the 
estimating procedure, joint zero restrictions are imposed on the explanatory variables in the general 
model or equation (3) to obtain the most parsimonious and robust estimators. The empirical results 
for the parsimonious models capturing short-run dynamics for unleaded petrol prices in seven 
capital cities are presented in Table 4. The estimated coefficients of the final specific models are all 
statistically significant at least at the 10 per cent level or better and have the expected theoretical 
signs. Despite being in log difference forms, these equations also performs extremely well in terms 
of goodness-of-fit statistics. The adjusted R2 varies from a minimum of 0.755 in Darwin to a 
maximum of 0.848 in Adelaide and the overall F test rejects the corresponding null hypothesis at 
the one per cent level. Furthermore, the estimated equations pass a battery of diagnostic tests and 
show no sign of misspecification, except for the Jarque-Bera normality test for Darwin and Hobart. 
The estimated coefficients have been sensibly signed, with log changes in both Tapis crude oil and 
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the Singapore petrol price having positive short-run elasticities. Furthermore, at least one of the 
corresponding feedback coefficients ( ) and/or  or θ θ θ+ −  for the EC term is highly significant, 
validating the significance of the cointegration relationship in the short-run model for petrol price. 
Based on the estimated short-run dynamic models presented in Table 4, the major findings of the 
paper have been summarised below. 
[Table 4 about here] 
First, the Singapore price of petrol appears to be a major determinant of petrol prices for 
each and every capital cities in Australia not only in the long-run (See Table 3) but also in short-run 
(Table 4). Second, although Tapis crude oil price exerts a long-run influence on Australia’s petrol 
prices (see Table 3), its short-run impacts are confined to only three capital cities namely Brisbane, 
Darwin and Sydney) occurring with two or three months delay. The log changes of crude oil price 
did not have any instantaneous effect on changes in petrol prices in any Australia’ capital cities. 
Also the current and lagged values of this variable were not statistically significant for the other 
four cities and as a result they were not included in the estimated final equations in Table 4. It can 
thus be concluded that Australia’s short-run petrol prices in Adelaide, Hobart, Melbourne and Perth 
are mainly influenced by the current or lagged (up to three months) changes in the Singapore price 
of petrol. The short-run variations in the price of petrol in Brisbane, Darwin and Sydney on the 
other hand are mainly driven not only by the current or lagged (up to two months) changes in the 
Singapore petrol price but also by the lagged (up to three months) changes in the Tapis crude oil 
price.  Third, in all capital cities (with the only exception being Darwin) the short-run changes in 
the price of crude oil did not exert any asymmetry effects on the changes in petrol prices as 
1
0 :   i iH iγ γ+ −= ∀  was rejected.  
Fourth, except in Darwin and Hobart that 20 :   i iH iη η+ −= ∀  could not be rejected, this 
hypothesis was rejected at the 5 per cent level of significance for the other five cities and for some 
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values of i. Therefore, it can be stated that changes in the Singapore petrol prices have asymmetrical 
impacts on petrol prices in all capital cities except Darwin and Hobart. It is interesting to note that 
where significant, the estimated coefficient for t is
−
−
∆ was greater than the corresponding coefficient 
for t is
+
−
∆ . So in those capital cities for which 20 :   i iH iη η+ −= ∀ were rejected, on an absolute value 
basis negative changes in the Singapore price could exert greater impacts on petrol prices compared 
to the corresponding positive changes of the same magnitude. This means for example 10 per cent 
decrease in t is
−
−
∆ will lead to greater changes in tp∆ than a similar 10 per cent increase in t is
+
−
∆ . This 
might appear to be quite favourable to consumers in the short-run but the analysis is not complete 
without undertaking a formal test on the third hypothesis, which is 30 :H θ θ+ −= . 
Fifth, the results in Table 4 indicate that 30 :H θ θ+ −=  can be rejected at 9 per cent level of 
significance or better for Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney, supporting the asymmetric 
price adjustment hypothesis. For these four cities the estimated θ − coefficients (in terms of their 
absolute values) were far greater than their corresponding θ + coefficients. This means that 
according to the past data when the short-run prices are above the long-run path (see equation 2), 
retail suppliers in these cities on average are more inclined to reduce their price to the equilibrium 
level very sluggishly. But on the other hand when petrol prices are below the long-run path, retail 
distributors increase their prices immediately to the equilibrium level. jθ −  varies from a minimum 
of 0.26− in Sydney to a maximum of 0.55− in Brisbane, suggesting that between 26-55 per cent of 
the short-run deviation (i.e. under pricing) from the long-run path is eliminated each month. Based 
on these results if prices were above the long-run path, within 2-4 months that divergence would 
have disappeared. According to the magnitude of the estimated adjustment coefficients in Brisbane 
( 2 0.55θ − = − ) and Melbourne ( 5 0.41θ − = − ), petrol price increases are passed on to the consumer 
faster than price decreases.  
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However, when the short-run deviations are positive (prices are above the long-run path), 
the speed of adjustment coefficients are much slower and/or statistically insignificant (see the 
estimated coefficients of 1jtEC
+
−
or jθ +  for Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney). Under these 
circumstances, the short-term variations in prices mainly corrected through variations in 
 and/or  or t i t i t is s s
− +
− − −
∆ ∆ ∆  and to a lesser extent through the lagged changes in crude oil prices. 
Therefore, the asymmetric price adjustments do exist for four out of seven Australia’s capital cities 
since j jθ θ+ −> . As can be seen from the estimated Wald tests in Table 4 no evidence of 
asymmetric price adjustment was found for Darwin, Hobart and Perth. The estimated symmetric 
speed of adjustment or jθ  are -0.118, -0.205 and -0.115 for Darwin, Hobart and Perth, respectively. 
Based on absolute values, the speed of adjustment for these three cities is also much lower than jθ −  
obtained for the other four cities. 3 
Sixth, the month-of-the year effects are significant in only four out of seven cities: positive 
impacts on average petrol price changes in December (Adelaide, Brisbane and Melbourne) and 
November (Brisbane) and negative impacts on the average price of petrol in Perth in both January 
and April. There are three possible explanations for the asymmetric response of petrol prices: (a) the 
oligopolistic price coordination theory (e.g Borenstein et al., 1997), (b) the production and 
inventory cost of adjustment (e.g. Kaufmann and Laskowski, 2005), and (c) the search theory 
(Johnson, 2002). Based on oligopolistic coordination theory, an increase in the price volatility can 
lead to a faster response of petrol prices to an oil price decrease and a reduction in the degree of 
asymmetry in the petrol price response. According to the search theory, an increase in retail price of 
petrol raises the incentive to search for a lower priced retail outlet, while a decrease in the price 
lowers the incentive to search. Peltzman (2000) also believes various measures of imperfect 
                                                     
3
  It should be noted that the optimum threshold values ranged (expressed in natural logarithm) from a minimum of -
0.0204 (Adelaide) to a maximum of 0.0512 (Darwin), translating to 0.97 cents and 1.05 cents, respectively. Since the 
threshold value ( )τ  is so close to zero (when the dotted and solid graphs intersect each other in Figure 1), the optimum 
value will be in vicinity of points a, b and c in Figure 1. 
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competition, inventory cost, inflation-related asymmetric menu costs, and input price volatility 
determine the degree of such an asymmetry.  
V  Concluding Remarks 
This paper tests the asymmetric responses of petrol prices at retail level to the positive and 
negative changes in each of the major sources of petrol price rises which are (1) Tapis crude oil 
prices; and (2) the Singapore petrol prices. The asymmetric effect of the error-correction term, 
representing the price deviation from its long-run path, has also been tested in the proposed models. 
This means that the negative and positive deviations from the long-run equilibrium prices are also 
allowed to exert asymmetric effects in the short-run error correction model. 
It is found that in the long-run petrol prices in Australia are mainly determined by both 
Tapis crude oil and the Singapore unleaded petrol price, with the latter exerting a higher impact in 
terms of the magnitude of its estimated long-run elasticities. The results indicate that in the case of a 
short-run price perturbation, petrol price increases are mostly passed on to the consumer faster than 
price decreases. In four major capital cities (i.e. Adelaide, Brisbane Melbourne and Sydney), it is 
found that j jθ θ− +> , providing convincing evidence in support of asymmetric price adjustments 
and the Bacon’s (1991) “rockets-and-feathers hypothesis”.  In other word, petrol prices respond 
quickly following negative deviation from the long-run patch and there would be much slower 
adjustment speed when petrol prices are above the long-run equilibrium path. One can thus argue 
that there are a significant degree of market inefficiency and/or collusion or tacit collusion, requiring a 
closer government price monitoring and scrutiny.  
 Of course these results are very aggregate and not specific enough to policy formulation. 
Future research can use more disaggregated data to provide relevant region-specific policy 
implications. For example, to achieve this, one can purchase daily data for 113 sample retail petrol 
stations over the same period (1998-2009) across seven states from the Australian Automobile 
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Association. The results of such a disaggregated analysis can then assist relevant government and 
private agencies (such as the ACCC, the Australian Automobile Association, Australian Institute of 
Petroleum, FuelWatch and MotorMouth etc.), which can play an important role in market efficiency 
and consumers’ protection.  For instance, motorists can find out in which sample retail outlet and/or 
geographical areas petrol price increases are passed on to them (if any) faster than price decreases 
and vice versa. The use of aggregated data can mask the existing price differences in small regional 
towns and rural areas. However, based on aggregate results this paper finds enough evidence for 
overall asymmetric price responses, justifying an urgent need for conducting further research and 
monitoring/regulating the price of petrol set by major oil companies in Australia. The use of more 
disaggregated data can make the retail and wholesale petrol markets more transparent by rigorously 
examining and testing the asymmetric petrol price responses arising from all of its possible external 
sources and providing region-specific recommendations. 
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FIGURE 1 
Graphical Definition of the Asymmetric Price 
Adjustment 
 
Note: the dotted and solid lines show the actual (short-
run) and the long-run price of petrol, respectively.   
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TABLE 1 
Sources and Definitions of the Monthly Data Employed (May 1998- January 2009)   
Variable Unleaded petrol price (Pit)  in: Ot St Et 
Description Adelaide Brisbane Darwin Hobart Melbourne Perth Sydney Tapis crude oil 
spot price6 
Singapore 
unleaded 
petrol price6 
Exchange 
rate 
Sources AAA1 AAA1 AAA1 AAA1 AAA1 AAA1 AAA1 EIA2 EIA3 RBA5 
Unit Cents per litre 
Cents per 
litre 
Cents per 
litre 
Cents per 
litre 
Cents per 
litre 
Cents per 
litre 
Cents per 
litre 
FOB $A per 
Barrel 
FOB Cents 
per litre4 $US per $A 
Mean 100.6 92.8 109.2 106.7 100.1 100.4 101.6 63.4 42.8 0.68 
Maximum 160.1 153.4 173.4 170.1 161.4 157.6 160.8 156.1 91.8 0.96 
Minimum 63.3 56.4 73.1 70.1 63.4 66.2 66.4 17.4 13.8 0.49 
Std. Dev. 23.3 23.7 23.9 23.5 23.7 22.3 23.0 30.0 18.3 0.12 
CV 23.2 25.5 21.9 22.0 23.7 22.2 22.6 47.4 42.6 17.6 
Skewness 0.536 0.576 0.647 0.618 0.586 0.583 0.588 0.801 0.638 0.35 
Kurtosis 2.60 2.50 2.59 2.65 2.55 2.56 2.59 3.33 2.77 2.34 
Jarque-Bera 7.04 8.49 9.88 8.87 8.50 8.36 8.34 14.37 9.04 4.9 
P-value 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.08 
Level form Ln(P1)=p1 Ln(P2)=p2 Ln(P3)=p3 Ln(P4)=p4 Ln(P5)=p5 Ln(P6)=p6 Ln(P7)=p7 Ln(O)=o Ln(S)=s Ln(E)=e 
ADF test -1.52 -1.59 -1.35 -1.64 -1.62 -1.68 -1.65 -1.81 -1.79 -1.35 
P-Value 0.52 0.49 0.61 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.37 0.39 0.61 
Optimum lag 8 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
First 
difference ∆p1 ∆p2 ∆p3 ∆p4 ∆p5 ∆p6 ∆p7 ∆o ∆s ∆e 
ADF test -5.14 -7.43 -8.14 -7.37 -8.42 -8.59 -8.43 -9.06 -9.22 -9.78 
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Optimum lag 7 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
 
Notes:  
1. Australian Automobile Association: www.aaa.asn.au/issues/petrol.htm 
2. Energy Information Administration: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm 
3. Energy Information Administration: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rp15sin5d.htm  
4. Gallon has been converted to litre assuming 1gallon=3.785 litre 
5. Reserve Bank of Australia: http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/HistoricalExchangeRates/index.html 
6. Ot and St were in the US dollars and US cents, respectively but they were converted to the Australian currency using the RBA’s exchange rate.  
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FIGURE 2 
 Plots of the Employed Data  
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TABLE 2 
Trace Cointegration Test Results 
Hypothesized 
no. of CE(s) 
for: 
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
P-
value** 
Optimum 
lag 
Adelaide     3 
None 0.315 66.42* 42.92 0.00  
At most 1 0.101 19.20 25.87 0.27  
At most 2 0.046 5.89 12.52 0.47  
Brisbane     3 
None 0.319 63.69* 42.92 0.00  
At most 1 0.073 15.76 25.87 0.51  
At most 2 0.049 6.25 12.52 0.43  
Darwin     2 
None 0.259 55.22* 42.92 0.00  
At most 1 0.071 17.51 25.87 0.38  
At most 2 0.063 8.17 12.52 0.24  
Hobart     2 
None 0.312 67.79* 42.92 0.00  
At most 1 0.098 20.58 25.87 0.20  
At most 2 0.059 7.61 12.52 0.29  
Melbourne     3 
None 0.321 64.29* 42.92 0.00  
At most 1 0.073 15.93 25.87 0.50  
At most 2 0.050 6.41 12.52 0.41  
Perth     3 
None 0.310 61.88* 42.92 0.00  
At most 1 0.076 15.49 25.87 0.53  
At most 2 0.044 5.63 12.52 0.51  
Sydney     3 
None 0.312 64.47* 42.92 0.00  
At most 1 0.085 17.68 25.87 0.37  
At most 2 0.052 6.64 12.52 0.38  
 Note: * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level; and ** 
denotes the MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
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TABLE 3 
Long-Run Determinants of Unleaded Petrol Prices in Capital Cities of Australia (1998M05-2009M01) 
Dependent 
variable R2 2R  Identifier  
Cointegrating vectors 
F-stat. Residuals ADF t ratio 
ADF p-
value 
 
Ln(Pit) Intercept ot st Tt 
Adelaide 0.981 0.980 Coefficient 2.574 0.074 0.325 0.001 2095   
   t-ratio 37.7 2.5 9.8 7.9  -5.31 0.00 
   p-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Brisbane 0.980 0.979 Coefficient 2.448 0.073 0.326 0.002 2007   
   t-ratio 32.1 2.2 8.8 10.3  -4.73 0.00 
   p-value 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00    
Darwin 0.959 0.958 Coefficient 3.123 0.146 0.169 0.002 980   
   t-ratio 34.1 3.7 3.8 7.8  -4.53 0.00 
   p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
Hob 0.966 0.965 Coefficient 2.915 0.080 0.261 0.002 1184   
   t-ratio 34.5 2.2 6.4 7.7  -4.51 0.00 
   p-value 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Melbourne 0.976 0.975 Coefficient 2.643 0.084 0.299 0.002 1683   
   t-ratio 34.3 2.5 8.0 8.4  -4.28 0.00 
   p-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00    
Perth 0.972 0.972 Coefficient 2.750 0.065 0.295 0.001 1468   
   t-ratio 35.62 1.9 7.9 7.8  -4.15 0.00 
   p-value 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Sydney 0.974 0.973 Coefficient 2.712 0.087 0.289 0.001 1562   
   t-ratio 35.5 2.6 7.8 7.3  -4.08 0.00 
   p-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00   
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TABLE 4 
Asymmetric Short-Run Dynamic models for Changes in Petrol Prices (1998M05-2009M01) 
Explanatory variables Adelaide Brisbane  
Coefficient t stat. P-value Coefficient t stat. P-value 
Intercept -0.001391 -0.6 0.5265 -0.005749 -1.8 0.0781 
2to −∆  
    0.053153 2.1 0.0388 
2to
−
−
∆  
        
3to
−
−
∆  
        
ts∆  0.325082 19 0 0.337 17 0 
ts
−∆  
        
ts
+∆  
        
1ts −∆   0.17175 10 0 0.234349 6.2 0 
2ts −∆  
        
2ts
−
−
∆  
    0.084541 2.4 0.018 
3ts
−
−
∆  0.081019 2.6 0.0113     
1jtEC −  
        
1jtEC
−
−
 
-0.350122 -2.7 0.0078 -0.545676 -4.4 0 
1jtEC
+
−
 
-0.117606 -1.4 0.1536 0.003718 0 0.9662 
DUM-January         
DUM-April         
DUM-November     0.014493 2.1 0.0419 
DUM-December 0.012381 1.9 0.058 0.017727 2.6 0.0117 
1itp −∆  
      -0.228877 -2.7 0.0069 
Asymmetric test on the EC term Statistics  P-Value Statistics  P-Value 
0 :H θ θ+ −=  F(1,110)=2.65    0.09 F(1,116)=10.63  0.00 
EC:         
Lower value of grid for the threshold -0.0299    -0.0332    
upper value of grid for the threshold 0.0367    0.0380    
Optimal value -0.0204     -0.0177     
R2 0.858    0.846    
2R  0.848    0.834    
F-statistic 85.5  0.00 70.9  0.00 
DW  2.02    1.94    
Diagnostic tests         
Jarque-Bera 0.57  0.75 3.76  0.16 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM F 
Test:         
2 lags 1.80  0.17 0.24  0.79 
4 lags 1.60  0.18 1.17  0.33 
8 lags 1.64  0.14 0.96  0.47 
Heteroskedasticity Tests         
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey F test 1.50  0.19 0.70  0.70 
ARCH F test         
1 lag  0.00  1.00 0.05  0.83 
2 lags 0.51  0.60 1.11  0.33 
4 lags  1.60  0.18 0.92  0.40 
White F test         
With cross terms 0.71  0.90 0.85  0.73 
Without cross terms 0.85  0.57 0.97  0.47 
Ramsey RESET F Test: 2.10   0.32 1.66   0.20 
 - 26 -
TABLE 4 (continued) 
Asymmetric Short-Run Dynamic models for Changes in Petrol Prices (1998M05-2009M01) 
Explanatory variables Darwin  Hobart Coefficient t stat. P-value Coefficient t stat. P-value 
Intercept 0.0051 2.5 0.01 0.0002 0.1 0.92 
2to −∆  
        
2to
−
−
∆  0.0859 2.5 0.01     
3to
−
−
∆  0.0754 2.2 0.03     
ts∆  0.1782 11.5 0.00 0.1970 11.7 0.00 
ts
−∆  
        
ts
+∆  
        
1ts −∆   0.1568 9.7 0.00 0.1932 10.4 0.00 
2ts −∆  0.0344 1.9 0.07 0.0489 2.8 0.01 
2ts
−
−
∆  
        
3ts
−
−
∆  
        
1jtEC −  
-0.1178 -2.8 0.01 -0.2053 -4.0 0.00 
1jtEC
−
−
 
        
1jtEC
+
−
 
        
DUM-January         
DUM-April         
DUM-November         
DUM-December         
1itp −∆  
            
Asymmetric test on the EC term Statistics  P-Value Statistics  P-Value 
0 :H θ θ+ −=  F(1,117)=1.57  0.21 F(1,121)=1.41  0.24 
EC:         
Lower value of grid for the threshold -0.0515    -0.0378    
upper value of grid for the threshold 0.0513   0.0446    
Optimal value 0.0512     0.0433     
R2 0.767   0.773    
2R  0.755   0.765    
F-statistic 64.6  0.00 103.8  0.00 
DW  2.02   2.09    
Diagnostic tests         
Jarque-Bera 14.12  0.00 19.65  0.00 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM F 
Test:         
2 lags 2.29  0.11 0.42  0.66 
4 lags 1.27  0.29 0.40  0.81 
8 lags 0.89  0.53 0.33  0.95 
Heteroskedasticity Tests         
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey F test 0.59  0.73 1.53  0.20 
ARCH F test         
1 lag  0.05  0.82 0.22  0.64 
2 lags 0.09  0.91 0.74  0.48 
4 lags  0.52  0.72 0.41  0.80 
8 lags 0.36  0.94 0.14  1.00 
White F test         
With cross terms 0.65  0.90 0.74  0.73 
Without cross terms 1.72  0.12 0.33  0.86 
Ramsey RESET F Test: 1.29   0.26 1.11   0.29 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Asymmetric Short-Run Dynamic models for Changes in Petrol Prices (1998M05-2009M01) 
Explanatory variables 
Melbourne  Perth 
Coefficient t stat. P-value Coefficient t stat. P-value 
Intercept -0.000975 -0.4 0.7135 0.0064 2.6 0.01 
2to −∆  
        
2to
−
−
∆  
        
3to
−
−
∆  
        
ts∆  0.307729 17 0     
ts
−∆  
    0.3412 13.1 0.00 
ts
+∆  
    0.2334 7.0 0.00 
1ts −∆   0.156855 8.4 0 0.1713 9.9 0.00 
2ts −∆  
        
2ts
−
−
∆  
        
3ts
−
−
∆  0.094017 2.9 0.0047     
1jtEC −  
    -0.1150 -2.3 0.03 
1jtEC
−
−
 
-0.414065 -4 0.0001     
1jtEC
+
−
 
-0.116623 -1.5 0.1326     
DUM-January     -0.0111 -1.7 0.09 
DUM-April     -0.0118 -1.7 0.08 
DUM-November         
DUM-December 0.016535 2.4 0.0178     
1itp −∆  
            
Asymmetric test on the EC term Statistics  P-Value Statistics  P-Value 
0 :H θ θ+ −=  F(1,118)=4.69  0.0324 F(1,119)=0.77  0.38 
EC:        
Lower value of grid for the threshold -0.0368    -0.0319   
upper value of grid for the threshold 0.0459    0.0423   
Optimal value -0.0244     -0.0291     
R2 0.816    0.838   
2R  0.807    0.828   
F-statistic 87.4  0.00 88.4  0.00 
DW  2.30    2.04   
Diagnostic tests         
Jarque-Bera 2.90  0.23 3.00  0.22 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM F 
Test:         
2 lags 2.26  0.11 0.59  0.56 
4 lags 1.89  0.12 0.43  0.79 
8 lags 1.20  0.31 0.41  0.91 
Heteroskedasticity Tests        
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey F test 0.53  0.78 0.50  0.81 
ARCH F test        
1 lag  0.33  0.57 0.23  0.63 
2 lags 0.40  0.67 0.12  0.88 
4 lags  0.26  0.90 0.23  0.92 
8 lags 0.51  0.85 0.37  0.94 
White F test         
With cross terms 0.63  0.91 0.73  0.86 
Without cross terms 0.36  0.90 0.58  0.79 
Ramsey RESET F Test: 1.29   0.26 0.04   0.85 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Asymmetric Short-Run Dynamic models for Changes in Petrol Prices 
 (1998M05-2009M01) 
Explanatory variables Sydney  Coefficient t stat. P-value 
Intercept 0.0013 0.5 0.65 
2to −∆  0.0379 2.0 0.05 
2to
−
−
∆  
    
3to
−
−
∆  
    
ts∆  
    
ts
−∆  0.3242 12.8 0.00 
ts
+∆  0.2263 6.9 0.00 
1ts −∆   0.1492 8.6 0.00 
2ts −∆  
    
2ts
−
−
∆  
    
3ts
−
−
∆  
    
1jtEC −  
    
1jtEC
−
−
 
-0.2596 -2.7 0.01 
1jtEC
+
−
 
-0.0285 -0.4 0.68 
DUM-January     
DUM-April     
DUM-November     
DUM-December     
1itp −∆  
      
Asymmetric test on the EC term Statistics  P-Value 
0 :H θ θ+ −=  F(1,119)=3.10  0.08 
EC: ECM7    
Lower value of grid for the threshold -0.03628    
upper value of grid for the threshold 0.046328    
Optimal value 0.02772     
R2 0.829    
2R  0.819    
F-statistic 82.3  0.00 
DW  2.01    
Diagnostic tests     
Jarque-Bera 4.40  0.12 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM F 
Test:     
2 lags 0.13  0.88 
4 lags 0.12  0.97 
8 lags 0.45  0.89 
Heteroskedasticity Tests      
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey F test 0.82  0.56 
ARCH F test      
1 lag  1.05  0.40 
2 lags 1.52  0.22 
4 lags  1.20  0.31 
8 lags 0.84  0.57 
White F test     
With cross terms 0.67  0.92 
Without cross terms 0.82  0.58 
Ramsey RESET F Test: 1.11   0.29 
 
